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EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE CORPUSCULAR THEORY 
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the empirical content 
and experimental foundation of the early seventeenth-century 
corpuscular hypothesis. Supported by ontological, epistemological, 
and mathematical arguments, observational and experimental evi -
dence played an important part in creating those patterns of 
thought that were instrumental in the transformation and, even-
tually, acceptance of the corpuscular theory of matter. 
Compared to the rise of astronomy and mechanics, the success of 
seventeenth-century atomism is ambiguous. Unlike other physical 
theories of the time the atomic doctrine was not based on exper-
iments l ikely to be accepted by today's scientific standards. 
In Galileo's inclined plane and his law of falling bodies or in 
Newton's theory of colors and his experimentum crucis with the 
prism, for example, theory and experiment, observation and conclu-
sion were connected in a way still acceptable to us. In atomism, 
however, this is not the case, although almost al l corpuscular 
theories of the seventeenth century explicitly claimed to be 
derived from and based upon experience. Yet, it was not until the 
nineteenth century that experimental results made the atoms at 
least plausible. 
The difficult relationship between seventeenth century atomism 
and its experimental foundation has been obscured to some extent 
by later historians. When the standard histories of atomism were 
written at the end of the nineteenth century 1 , a final experi-
mental confirmation of the corpuscular nature of matter was still 
lacking. Twentieth-century historians, on the other hand, have 
underestimated the empirical difficulties involved in early modern 
atomism.2 Knowing that there are atoms i n nature, they could 
hardly imagine how the protagonists of the scientific revolution 
should not have arr ived at this same conclusion. 
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2. EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENTS 
The empirical arguments presented to support atomism during the 
first half of the seventeenth century were mainly based upon five 
groups of phenomena: 
1. Extrapolations from macroscopic bodies; 
2. observations by means of the microscope; 
3. transport processes such as evaporation, abrasion or growth; 
4. condensation and rarefaction including the question of the 
vacuum; 
5. chemical processes such as reductions of metals. 
2.1. Extrapolations 
Traditional arguments put forward - for the first time in an-
tiquity and most of them in Lucretius' De rerum natura - were 
extrapolations. The most frequently quoted example was the one of 
insects which are so small that their third part would already be 
beyond the limits of visibili ty. How small then, Lucretius asked, 
must their organs be, and how small, in the end, the atoms out of 
which everything is composed?3 
Originally aimed at giving but an idea of atomic dimensions, 
the observation was quoted frequently in order to prove their very 
existence. On a similar level lies the comparison of the atoms to 
the size of tiny motes one sees dancing back and forth when a ray 
of sunlight falls in a dark room.4 In either case the empirical 
facts referred to were loci classici from a li terary tradition of 
figurative use of pictures, aimed at creating astonishment and, 
through astonishment, assent and persuasion. 
Authors scarcely expanded on these examples; they simply quoted 
them. In 1643 Claude Bérigard presented a carefully designed 
experimental verification of Lucretius' motes in the sunbeam.5 To 
exclude the possibility that the phenomenon was caused by major 
particles such as normal dust, he sealed a glass vessel and kept 
it quiet for a long time making sure that all dust had settled. 
The minute reflecting particles he observed nevertheless inside 
the glass were consequently judged to be the atoms themselves. 
Among those to make the first, if cautious, steps towards a 
quantitative determination of atomic dimensions was Daniel Sennert 
in 1636. In a series of experiments6 designed to prove the exist-
ence of atoms Sennert described a distillation in which a stream 
of alcohol vapor passed through a sheet of paper, the density of 
which was supposed to give an idea of how small the atoms really 
were. This certainly was an impressive experiment, but at the same 
time a tacit reference to Lucret ius. 7 Sennert went on to give 
examples of various distillations, comparing the enormous volume 
of vapor and the myriads of atoms in it to the small droplets into 
which they condense, or the smoky wick of an extinguished candle 
to the huge volume of air that was filled by its smoke. 
The language in which these observations were described abounds 
with quantitative statements such as to the duration of the exper-
iment, the number of corpuscles, the amount of the product, and 
the size of the candle-wick. However, it is clear that there was 
no quantitative methodology behind these indications. Sennert used 
the language of the laboratory in a merely figurative and per-
suasive manner, appealing to the imagination of the reader. 
On the basis of impressive calculations Johann Magnenus even 
suggested exact figures for the size of an atom.8 But what does it 
prove for the result computed in such a way to come surprisingly 
close to modern figures? Were such calculations really quanti-
tative science or merely a scholarly variation of a theme from 
Archimedes' The Sand-Reckoner? Playing with numbers seemed quite 
common, indeed. In 1654 Walter Charleton published exactly the 
same calculation 9, though at least he should have been aware of 
the warnings by his admired hero Gassendi: Referring to Arch i -
medes' attempts to compute the number of sand grains that fit into 
a poppy-seed, the French philosopher had already pinpointed the 
methodological problems involved in transferring this kind of 
geometric reasoning to physical matters. 1 0 
However, since Magnenus' calculations have been recently called 
the beginning of the quantitative methodology in atomic physics 1 1, 
it might be worth while examining more closely the attitude of 
this allegedly scientific mind towards experience and experiment. 
There is no doubt that Magnenus favored the empirical and mechan-
ical spirit of his age; nevertheless his work abounds with purely 
dialectical reasoning and syllogistic conclusions. The only 'real' 
experiment he presented in great detail was taken from a popular 
compendium of natural magic12: According to Quercetanus13 a Polish 
physician was reported to keep a collection of sealed glass ves-
sels containing finely ground flowers of various kinds. When a 
candle was put underneath the vessel the corpuscles coalesced 
under the influence of heat to form a perfect blossoming plant. 
When the candle was removed, it again disintegrated. This strange 
experiment acquired some fame among the attempts of proving the 
reality of the atoms and was discussed even among the most respec-
table scientists of that time. 1 4 Needless to say, this was not the 
kind of experiment upon which a scientific atomism could have been 
properly established. 
2.2. Microscopical Perception 
Seventeenth-century science was fond of the small, the worlds to 
be found in a drop of water. There was a widespread enthusiasm for 
the magnifying glass and for the microscope which had just been 
invented. The new instruments made it possible to come closer to 
the details, closer to reality, and - so it was assumed - closer 
to truth. The possibilities of optical ingenuity seemed unlimited. 
In a chapter on the size of the atoms Gassendi thoughtfully medi-
tated about what degree of refinement the borderline between 
man's and nature's subtlety might be extended to by the use of the 
microscope. 1 5 
What had been a merely potential aptitude of the instrument to 
Gassendi, was presented as an empirical fact by Henry Power a 
few years later. His Experimental Philosophy, the first English 
book on microscopy, claimed enthusiastically that the microscope 
enabled men to "see what the illustrious wits of the Atomical and 
Corpuscularian Philosophers durst but imagine, even the very Atoms 
and their reputed Indivisibles and least realities of Matter." 1 6 
This was more than the selling rhetoric so common with prefaces. 
Power studied traces of mercury and found that the "atoms of 
Quick-silver [ ... ] seemed like a globular Looking-glass" 1 7 . 
From the heterogeneity and particulate structure of a cosmetical 
precipitate, he inferred that "all the globular Atoms of current 
and quick [mercury]; besprinkled all amongst those Powders, like 
so many little Stars in the Firmament" remain unaltered when a 
compound is formed and retain their true nature, 1 8 
As a serious scientist, however, Power had to admit that he 
failed to succeed in seeing any corporeal effluvia by means of 
his optical device, although others had claimed to have seen the 
magnetic effluvium. Power, the meticulous observer, was convinced 
that such an observation "indeed would be an incomparable Eviction 
of the Corporeity of [ ... 1 Effluviums, and sensibly decide the 
Controversy 'twixt the Peripatetic and Atomical Philosophers" 1 9. 
Stimulating as these instruments were for the study of biology, 
their meaning remained ambiguous in matter theory. Joachim Jungius 
used the magnifying glass for a thorough study of apparently homo-
geneous substances. He observed that they were in fact always 
heterogeneous if viewed through a microscope, and no surface 
could be so smooth that one could not think of a more powerful 
microscope that would reveal its real discontinuity. Consequently, 
Jungius stated that continuity must be exempt from the ju r i s -
diction of sensuous experience. On the other hand, if there were 
no truly continuous parts in the end, endless progression and 
divisibil i ty would result. 2 0 This was the vicious circle of every 
empirical approach to the atoms. Since they are so small that they 
could be inferred only rationally, methodological difficulties and 
a contradictory epistemology arose if one attempted to model the 
real after the visible. 
2.3. Material Transport 
Transport phenomena in which material substances appear or dis-
appear invisibly provided a similar type of argument: Smell is 
an efflux of corporeal particles and comes to an end once its 
material source is exhausted. 2 1 Clothes hung near the seashore 
become wet and dry again in the sunshine.22 The drying of bread or 
the slow evaporation of liquids are material processes, although 
the flux of material cannot be observed. In all these cases, 
quantitative change can be recorded, and from this the existence 
of invisible parts of matter could be inferred. Yet, this was 
not a very original conclusion, but rather an application of the 
theory of effluxion proposed by Empedocles, empirically founded by 
Democritus and Asclepiades of Prusa and eventually collected in 
Lucretius' poem. In the seventeenth century these examples were 
repeated over and over again, and similar ones were added. 
It is hard to believe that this kind of naive realism was taken 
more seriously than we can take it with regard to the question 
of atoms. Three aspects should be given particular consideration: 
the phenomena dealt with so far suggested that the ultimate con-
stituents of matter were (i) potentially observable by extended 
experimental effort, (ii) deductible by analogy, and (iii) pro-
vable by virtue of their actions. Yet there is little doubt that 
they were not suitable to definitively decide the question of 
matter, and they were certainly not understood in this manner by 
the contemporaries. The frequent occurrence and repetition of 
these observations, however, the persuasive idea that truth should 
be visible or could be thought of in a pictorial way infiltrated 
the scholarly discourse and the very language of science. In the 
end the idea of little particles as constituent parts of bodies 
became plausible, even though philosophically not entirely l e -
gitimate. Furthermore, and this was of no less importance, it 
transferred the corpuscular question to another level of inquiry. 
For now it became necessary to prove the material identity of 
these particles. This was, of course, a chemical question, but we 
have to deal with the more physical arguments first before we 
return to chemistry. 
2.4. Condensation and Rarefaction 
Unlike the instances of naive induction from sense perception 
dealt with so far, condensation and rarefaction and, above all , 
the vacuum, belong to a field of physical experimentation where 
one would expect more convincing departures from the traditional 
ways of reasoning. In ancient atomism, with its hard and impene-
trable atoms, change required motion, and motion required a void 
space to move into. The nature of this void, however, was a matter 
of endless controversies unt i l the eighteenth century. 2 3 Two 
alternatives had already been discussed by the Greeks: the con-
tinuous or three-dimensionally extended void and, secondly, the 
more widely received idea of a discontinuous, interspersed void 
between the particles of matter. 
There was one classical experiment that used to be interpreted 
as evidence supporting the existence of microvacua: A vessel 
filled with loose ashes holds as much water as the empty vessel, 
because the tiny ash particles are received within the pores or 
vacua of the water. The observation was reported by Aristotle 2 4, 
referring to those who believed in the void, but was rejected on 
the grpund that two bodies cannot occupy the same space simultane-
ously. This was indeed puzzling and kept the medieval commentators 
busy. Francis Bacon was presumably the first to disprove the 
phenomenon in question experimentally. 2 5 
In reality, things were not as simple. In Gassendi's Syntagma 
philosophicum the ash experiment was rejected on both experimental 
and philosophical grounds. 2 6 Instead, the French philosopher 
proposed another and more convincing experiment. He took water, 
saturated with ordinary salt, and found that this solution was 
s t i l l as capable of dissolving alum as pure water would have 
been. 2 7 From this Gassendi concluded that there must be various 
differently shaped microvacua in the water, each kind of which 
receives exactly one kind of corpuscles, e.g. a cubic space a 
cubic corpuscle such as salt, and an octaedric space an octaedric 
one such as alum. But wasn't it absurd to assume that the volume 
remained constant when another volume was added? This is exactly 
what Gassendi's carping cri t ic Jean-Baptiste Morin thought. He 
repeated the experiment more carefully in a glass flask with a 
graduated neck and found that when salt, alum, and sugar were 
added to water, the volume of the resulting solution was greater 
than that of pure water. 2 8 From textual evidence alone, it is 
difficult to judge who was correct. In fact, either observation 
may have been correct: There are indeed certain salts that do 
not increase the volume of water when they are dissolved, and 
water-free alum is one of them. 
Apart from explaining solution, the hypothesis of interparti-
culate vacua seemed especially helpful in understanding coherence. 
The standard experiment was the separation of two entirely flat 
surfaces from direct contact in order to show that during this 
process a void must result since the air cannot f i l l the entire 
space opened instantaneously. 2 9 Though originally supposed to 
prove the existence of a vacuum, the experiment scon acquired a 
crucial position among the proofs for its non-existence. It was 
sti l l in this sense that Galileo, who rejected the extended void, 
referred to it as a perfect i l lustration for nature's abhorres-
cence of a vacuum. 3 0 He described a hydrostatic experiment de-
signed to measure the breaking force of a water column that would 
give him a quantitative value for what he called la resistenza del 
vacuo*31 It was exactly this "resistance of the vacuum" which he 
believed to be responsible for the strength and rupture tension of 
solid bodies. 
The problem of coherence and the void became even more acute 
in condensation and rarefaction. The Aristotelian explanation was, 
that a given amount of matter could assume, at different times, 
contrary qualities; and since dense and rare were contrary qual-
ities, the same amount of matter could occupy different volumes 
at different times while maintaining its identity through the 
changing modes of its existence.3 2 Indeed no corpuscular expla-
nation of a similar smoothness was available. Few authors would 
have admitted that the interspersed vacua could be blown up to a 
size that would account for the observed change of volume during 
evaporation. Otherwise, they would have had to admit a continuous 
vacuum. It is well known that, even after the Torricellian vacuum 
had been experimentally demonstrated in 1643, it was by no means 
unanimously considered to be entirely void. The first atomist to 
discuss the Torricellian experiment in great depth was presumably 
Gassendi; but even his account on the vacuum remained vague as to 
its meaning in theory of matter. 3 3 
Instead of admitting the void, most authors assumed some kind 
of ether or spirit that filled the spaces between the vapor atoms 
and glued the corpuscles of solid bodies together. Yet, the re-
introduction of an active spirit or ether into atomism, aimed at 
explaining how the atoms interact and how their actions are trans-
mitted, undermined the theoretical consistency of the mechanical 
corpuscularianism, while the question of change and motion re-
mained, however relegated to a somewhat lower level. Plenist 
corpuscular theories such as Descartes' 3 4 exemplify that it was 
entirely acceptable to assume corpuscles wiihout admitting the 
void. 
2.5. Chemical Change 
The chemical arguments in support of the atomic view of matter 
refer to two kinds of phenomena: Processes generating a new mix-
turn, or processes recovering constituents of a compound in their 
former state. In both cases it was to be explained how distinct 
atomic particles interact and how, from this interaction, new 
qualities emerge that were not originally present in the reac-
tants. The emergence or eduction of a new form during substantial 
alterations was indeed the great theme of early seventeenth-
century peripatetic theory of matter. 3 5 Here purely mechanical 
action, and especially local motion, was not a sufficient explana-
tion. Therefore additional hypotheses came into play which did not 
originally belong to, or were even contradictory to, the p r i n -
ciples of atomism, such as the corporeal ether, active spiri ts , 
neoplatonic concepts of sympathy and antipathy, or the teleology 
of directing forms acting upon moving particles. 
On the other hand, there was the old tradition of metallurgists 
and practical chemists who ignored such abstract questions and 
naively took the original reactants and their properties as the 
true constituents of a compound.3 6 It is significant that Sennert 
explicitly admitted that there was no way of proving the mechanism 
by which the unity of parts was effectuated and the form of the 
new compound generated. 3 7 Practical chemist as he was, Sennert 
preferred to leave such questions to others, and went on to argue 
that at least one thing was certain, namely that every mixture 
could be resolved into those parts of which it was originally 
constituted. For, if the identity of the constituent parts was not 
constant, there would be a generation of new constituents during 
the process of resolution and decay. 
Of course, this was a tautology and depended on how one defines 
'constituent part'. Yet, it was an important step within the 
'chemical' argumentation in favour of corpuscles. For now, it was 
no longer necessary to bother with substantial change and the 
emergence of new qualities; instead, the question was reduced to a 
test of identity in a cyclic process. Once the identity of the 
original reactants and the final product could be demonstrated 
experimentally, the persistency of substantial identity in a 
material carrier would be proved, no matter how many alterations 
had occurred between the starting and final substances. This was 
clearly a departure from the former preoccupation with the quid-
dity of processes, and from the ontological level of the atomic 
theory to something that might be called a 'black box theory' of 
chemical change. 
2,5.1. Reduction 
There is ample evidence that the ground for this new perspective 
had been laid by the pragmatism and the atheoretical attitude of 
metallurgists and iatrochemists. However, such people were hardly 
literate and rarely uttered their theoretical assumptions. Angelus 
Sala, court physician, pharmacist, and advisor on commercial 
subjects, described pragmatically and to some extent also quanti-
tatively the formation and decomposition of copper v i t r io l . 3 8 In 
doing so he distinguished, as usual, between transmutations and 
changes that resulted from a mere juxtaposition of particles. 
These latter processes were either coniunctionesf such as the 
alloying of gold and silver, or reductiones by means of which 
little particles were reassembled into their former coherent 
state.39 The best example was a solution of gold in aqua regia and 
its precipitation using metallic si lver, a process which Sala 
considered a mere division and rearrangement of metal atoms. He 
believed the metal to retain its substantial identity, though 
"hidden" because of its dispersion into single atoms. As a practi-
tioner Sala did not bother with the nature of this "hiding" of 
qualities; instead he accepted the reduction to the pristine me-
tallic state as sufficient proof of the identity of gold through-
out this process. 
Daniel Sennert, on the other hand, the learned professor of 
medicine, preferred to maintain the teleology of directing forms 
to account for the specific properties. Expanding on Sala's ap-
proach he conceived a more convincing argumentation, based upon a 
great variety of processes which he classified as reductions to 
the pristine state. 4 0 The first type were simple distillations and 
sublimations of substances such as alcohol, sulphuric acid, and 
sulphur, which he regarded to be merely mechanical operations by 
means of which bodies were mashed into their atoms. 
A chemically more sophisticated argument came from the reduc-
tion of different mercury compounds to running mercurium vivum. In 
order to prove that, indeed, real atoms of mercury were involved 
and not just new substantial forms generated, Sennert referred 
to the nightmares of Paracelsian medication: Ointments and fu-
migations with mercury had the effect that a coin, put i n the 
patient's mouth, became amalgamated - not to mention the findings 
of a postmortem autopsy. In all these examples the reduction to 
the pristine state was the decisive cri terion. 
The same is true for another type of experiment presented to 
prove that it was not the substantial form of a mixture that 
preserved the identity of its compounds, but in fact the atoms 
themselves41: Sennert fused gold and silver together to obtain an 
entirely homogeneous alloy. Then he poured aqua fortis or nitric 
acid on it. The silver was dissolved, whereas the gold particles 
settled to the bottom. He separated the two phases and precipi-
tated the silver from the solution to obtain another fine sedi-
ment. Eventually, he melted both powders and obtained, quanti-
tatively, gold in the first case, si lver in the latter. 
All these experiments were of course not 'invented' by Sennert, 
and it is irrelevant whether he actually performed them. Yet, he 
was the first to connect them systematically in order to demon-
strate that the reductio in pristinum statum could be used as 
an argument in favour of atomism. It is interesting to see that 
Sennert, coming to this conclusion in 1636, had to revise his 
former ideas concerning the transmutation of metals from the 
corpuscular point of view. 
2.5.2. Transmutation 
Metallic transmutation was supported by old and well documented 
evidence, suitable as a defense of both the Aristotelian doctrine 
of substantial alteration and the alchemists' quest for gold: 
Certain springs and rivers had the peculiar property that a piece 
of i ron, upon being immersed for some time, turned into true 
copper, first at the surface, and later throughout. This process, 
called cementation, had been known for a very long time and had 
been described by scientists whose credibility was beyond any 
d o u b t . « 
Few authors denied these observations, among them the Lorraine 
physician Nicolas Guibert, whose explanations were ridiculed by 
Sennert in 1629. This was not just because Sennert at that time 
was still an Aristotelian, but because he could rely on experimen-
tal proofs. 4 3 However, when, in 1651, the posthumous edition of 
Sennert's collected works was published, the editor had to add a 
note found among Sennert's manuscript remains. 4 4 In it Sennert 
admitted that the alleged transmutation was presumably a mere 
separation of copper from its vitriolic solution by means of iron, 
and correctly considered this process as an exchange of atoms that 
retain their chemical identity. 
Sennert went even one step further and conceived an experiment 
by which the t ruly quantitative character of the cementation 
process was to be proved: One ounce of copper was dissolved in 
sulphuric acid to obtain the acid, blue solution of copper v i t -
riol. Then two ounces of iron filings were added. The vessel was 
kept in a warm place until all of the iron had disappeared. As a 
result the blue colour of the solution turned colorless, and a red 
precipitate settled at the bottom. This precipitate was washed, 
dried, and reduced, to yield exactly one ounce of copper - the 
very same amount that had been dissolved originally. 4 5 Again the 
method of reducido in pristinum statum was applied to demonstrate 
the existence of atoms. In doing so, Sennert was able to avoid the 
difficulties involved in explaining what happened to the proper-
ties of the metal when it 'united' with the 'salt' in solution, 
or whether the particles of copper, salt, and water form an essen-
tially uniform mixture or a mere juxtaposition of parts. 
Taken together, the chemical evidence presented by various 
authors to support the corpuscular view of matter supplied good 
empirical reasons for regarding natural bodies as divisible into 
much smaller ones that somehow retain the specific properties and 
can frequently be recombined to yield the original body. Yet 
the range and depth of experimental proofs for the atoms as such 
remained limited. A limited number of standard experiments was 
referred to more frequently in writing than repeated or extended 
in the laboratory. Attempts to widen the experimental basis of 
the corpuscular theory of matter were exceptional and barely 
convincing. 
3. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to believe that arguments of this kind were ca-
pable to convince those who did not already share the atomic view 
of matter. Writing in the 1660's even Robert Boyle had to concede 
that the corpuscular hypothesis had not yet been, and probably 
never could be proved conclusively.4 6 Mere extrapolations from the 
visible to an underlying invisible reality were philosophically 
naive and epistemologically questionable. Distillations, evapo-
rations, growth of crystals etc., were certainly appropriate for 
showing that something material was transferred from one place to 
another, but they did not prove its corpuscular nature. Although 
the atoms would have supplied an easy mechanism, the corpuscular 
interpretation of rarefaction and condensation remained ques-
tionable, since the entire problem of how the atoms interact and 
cohere was open, and the existence of an extended void would have 
had to be admitted. The introduction of a material ether disposed 
of these problems while creating new ones by the strange hybr i -
dization of particulate and continuous matter. Thus, as far as the 
experimental support for the atomic theory was concerned, the 
chemists and iatrochemists offered the more convincing, though by 
no means decisive, arguments. 
By its very nature the chemical approach was pragmatic, realis-
tic, and eclectic. The majority of chemists worked on real matter 
and real properties in a purposeful way. After all, they wanted to 
sell a product or to cure a patient. They simply could not afford 
to rely too closely upon a rigid theory, not even a corpuscular 
philosophy of the Boylean kind. Needless to recall that, as op-
posed to a stubborn historiographical myth, Boyle's clock-work 
universe, which provided so many fertile concepts to seventeenth-
century physics, "proved a sterile and occasionally adverse intel-
lectual climate for an understanding of the processes underlying 
chemical change."47 It was not the mechanical philosophy that was 
to succeed in chemistry, but a non-committal, substance-oriented 
notion of corpuscle, something that was more like an elementary 
particle or a small amount of substance than a Democritean atom. 
During the subsequent development of chemistry Baconian empir-
icism and the naive realism of the chemists were to prevail over 
the philosophically consistent atomism of the late seventeenth 
century. By the standards of Boyle's corpuscular philosophy and 
John Locke's insistence on the epistemológica! status of the cor-
puscles4 8, there was nothing of its kind throughout the eighteenth 
century. The new interest focussed on elements and affinity, not 
on atoms and motion.49 Its non-committal character was certainly 
not the least advantage of the kind of corpuscularianism favoured 
by the 'chemical' atomists. The restricted nature of its episte-
mological support enabled the resulting notion of corpuscle to 
assume whatever requirements future research was to find con-
venient. The traditional insistence on the ontological conformity 
of science and nature, the requirement of proof or falsification 
by means of experiment, and, what is more, the very question of 
the truth-value was dismissed in favour of a merely instrumental 
or operational l ink between theory and reality. 
In 1661 Henry Power, the microscopist, s t i l l believed that 
scientific knowledge, with the help of the new instruments, would 
eventually advance to the very atoms and least realities of mat-
ter. "A part of Philosophy," he wrote, "but yet in discovery; and 
will , I fear, prove the last Leaf to be turned over in the Book 
of Nature." 5 0 To Robert Boyle, on the other hand, whose reading 
experience with that book was derived from 'chemical,' not micro-
scopical observations, it was of less concern which key was the 
true one to decipher nature's cryptograms: Any key would do pro-
vided it made coherent sense and was fit to solve the phenomena, 
for which it was devised: 
In the physical explications of the parts and system of the 
world, me thinks, there is somewhat like what happens, when 
men conjecturally frame several keys to enable us to under-
stand a letter written in cyphers. For though one man by his 
sagacity have found out the right key, it will be very dif-
ficult for him, to prove otherwise than by trial , that this 
or that word is not such, as it is guessed to be by others, 
according to their keys; [ ... ] yet, i f due t r ia l being 
made, the key he proposes, shall be found so agreeable to 
the characters of the letter, as to enable one to understand 
them, and make a coherent sense of them, its suitableness to 
what it should decypher, is, without confutations, or ex-
traneous positive proofs, sufficient to make it be accepted 
as the r ight key of that cypher . 5 1 
Due to its tentative nature the corpuscular hypothesis was even 
more viable than any r igid theory or ontological determination 
ever would have been. Its directing influence on future research 
was founded less on immediate results, than - as it was not un-
common in early modern science - on the basis of hope and promise. 
It was not until John Dalton's chemical atomism in the early nine-
teenth century, however, that this promise was to be fulfilled. 
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